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DEADLY CONFUSION: JUROR INSTRUCTIONS
IN CAPITAL CASES
Theodore Eisenberg* & Martin 7. Wells**
A fatal mistake. A defendant is sentenced to die because the jury
was misinformed about the law. The justice system should be
designed to prevent such a tragic error. Yet our interviews with jurors
who served in South Carolina capital cases indicate that this
nightmare is a reality.
Although our data are limited to South Carolina, the question
whether jurors are adequately instructed in capital cases is of national
concern. For example, the issue whether jurors should be more fully
informed about the alternative to a death sentence has arisen in other
states.' And the question whether jurors understand the burdens of
proof in capital cases can arise in any death penalty state.
2
As with many death penalty issues, it is tempting to view the ques-
tion of juror instructions solely as a question for resolution by the
Supreme Court as a matter of federal constitutional law.3 This narrow
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supplied by the Cornell Law School and the South Carolina Death Penalty Resource
Center. We would like to thank Taron Brown, Deborah Czuba, Ryan Faulkner, H. Mat-
thew Horlacher, Marta Kahn, Lisa Kimbrough, David Kully, Mary Parasiliti, Erika Verrill,
Mary Beth Welch, and Doug Wise for conducting the interviews, Eric Ehrenberg for re-
search assistance and designing the database, Drucy Glass for supervising the interviewing
process, Laura Myers and Drucy Glass for training the interviewers, and Karen Wilson for
her invaluable assistance with the data.
** Associate Professor of Statistics, Department of Economic and Social Statistics, Cor-
nell University.
1 Quick v. State, 353 S.E.2d 497, 503 (Ga. 1987) (parole eligibility should not be
considered at sentencing phase of death penalty case); Commonwealth v. Henry, 569 A.2d
929, 941 (Pa. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991); Jenkins v. Commonwealth,
423 S.E.2d 360, 369-70 (Va. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1862 (1993). At least
thirteen states inform the jury that a capital murder conviction carries with it a defendant's
ineligibility for parole. James M. Hughes, Note, InfonningSouth Carolina Capital juries About
Parole, 44 S.C. L. Rav. 383, 405-06 n.153 (1993). Three other states require a capital case
jury to be informed that the defendant will be ineligible for parole, either in all cases or
when the defendant's prior criminal record precludes parole. Id. at 406. See also Willam
W. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in
Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605 (1989) (recommending that instructions about pa-
role be given in Virginia cases).
2 SeeJames Luginbuhl, Discretion in Capital Sentencing. Guided or Misguided (pa-
per presented at the meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago, May 30, 1993)
(North Carolina data) (on file with authors).
3 Franklin E. Zimring, On the Liberating Virtues of Irrelevance, 27 LAw & Soc'y REv. 9
(1993).
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perspective may be reinforced by the Supreme Court's grant of certio-
rari in State v. Simmons4 to decide whether a jury should be informed
when a life sentence means life without the possibility of parole. How-
ever important Supreme Court death penalty decisions are, the initial
responsibility for instructing jurors rests with trial judges. Our data
and analysis should inform trial judges about the real impact of the
instructions they choose to give and not to give. Even if the Constitu-
tion does not mandate full and clear instructions, trial judges and re-
viewing courts should provide them in the sound exercise of their
discretion.
After describing the data and the law in Part I, Part II shows that
jurors' false expectations about alternatives to the death sentence
probably influence their sentencing decisions. Part III establishes that
jurors do not understand the burdens of proof governing the sentenc-
ing phase of murder trials. Part IV shows that confusion works against
the defendant because the jurors' strong initial inclination is to sen-
tence to death.
I. THE DATA AND APPLICABLE LAW
A. The Data
The data analyzed here were gathered as part of the Capital Jury
Project, a National Science Foundation-funded multistate research ef-
fort. The Project is intended to fill a major gap in our knowledge of
death penalty decisionmaking. Researchers trying to draw inferences
about how jurors determine capital case sentences tend to rely on
surveys of the general population,5 on anecdotal data from individual
cases, 6 and on material in the written record, 7 but not on data system-
atically gathered from jurors who sat in capital cases. Such systematic
data is scarce. The data gathered by the Capital Jury Project should
4 427 S.E.2d 175 (S.C.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 57 (1993).
5 James A. Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-Furman Years, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 499 (1991); Hood, supra note 1; Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford
Smith, Deathly Errors:Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty,
18 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 211 (1987). SeeJ. Mark Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?"': A
Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy. L-A L. REv. 327, 334
(1993) (collecting studies).
6 Lane, supra note 5, at 334-44 (reporting juror interviews in three cases and in stud-
ies encompassing as many as six cases).
7 Id. at 335-38 (reviewing Georgia capital cases in which deliberatingjurors asked the
trial judge questions about parole). Onejuror interview study covered 10 Florida capital
cases and 54 jurors. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. CriM. L. 1, 8-9 (1988).
An Oregon study covered nine Oregon capital cases and 27 jurors. See Sally Costanzo &
Mark Costanzo, Life or Death Decisions: An Analysis of Capital Jury Decision-Making Under the
Special Issues Sentencing Framework, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming). See also Mark
Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phas 16 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 185, 189 (1992) (noting that few studies involve interviews with capital case jurors).
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begin to inform policymakers and courts about how actual jurors de-
cide between life and death.
The results reported here are from the Capital Jury Project's ef-
forts in South Carolina. Jurors who sat in thirty-one South Carolina
murder cases were randomly sampled, with a goal of four juror inter-
views per case. Nineteen cases resulting in death sentences and twelve
cases resulting in life sentences are in the sample. The cases in the
study are all South Carolina capital cases (other than resentencings)
brought since enactment of the South Carolina Omnibus Criminal
Justice Improvements Act of 1986.8 That law worked fundamental
changes in the standards of parole in capital cases and provided a
logical stopping point. A total of 114 live interviews were completed
by interviewers trained to work with the interview instrument.9
The fifty-page interview instrument, designed and tested by the
Capital Jury Project, covered all phases of the guilt and sentencing
trials.10 The data include facts about the crime; the racial, economic
and other characteristics of the defendant, the victim and their fami-
lies; the process ofjuror deliberation; and the conduct of the case by
defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge. The interviews also
included questions aboutjurors' background characteristics and their
views on the death penalty.
B. South Carolina's Death Penalty Statute
If a prosecutor has given notice that the state seeks the death
penalty," a sentencing trial follows the defendant's conviction for
murder.' 2 After hearing evidence at the sentencing phase, the jury
must determine whether at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance is present. If an aggravating circumstance is present ajury may
sentence the defendant to death but is not required to do so. Murder
under aggravating circumstances includes murder committed during
the commission of certain serious crimes such as kidnapping and
rape, murder of a police officer, and murder by a defendant previ-
ously convicted of murder.'3 Thejury may also consider statutory mit-
igating circumstances. These include lack of prior convictions for
violent crime, the age or mental capacity of the defendant, duress,
8 1986 S.C. Acts 2983.
9 The interview process is continuing and cases will be added to the sample as the
interviews are completed and the data coded. The data analyzed here reflect all interviews
completed through the summer of 1992.
10 Justice Research Center, Northeastern University, Juror Interview Instrument, Na-
tional Study ofJuror Decision Making in Capital Cases (on file with authors).
11 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(A) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
12 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
13 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (a) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
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and provocation. 14 If the jury does not unanimously find the pres-
ence of an aggravating circumstance, the sentence is automatically life
imprisonment. 15
II. EXPECTATIONS ABou-r NONDEATH SE=ENCES
A defendant's future dangerousness to society is an appropriate
factor in death sentence decisions. Although South Carolina statutes
do not mandate considering dangerousness as an aggravating factor
in sentencing, 16 the state's evidence in aggravation is not limited to
statutory aggravating circumstances. 17 South Carolina prosecutors fre-
quently emphasize a defendant's dangerousness. In their evidence
and argument at the punishment stage, they often note that the death
penalty will keep the defendant from killing again and cite the danger
to the public if the defendant were ever to escape or to be released
from prison.' The frequency with which dangerousness is argued to
the jury estops the state from claiming that dangerousness is not at
issue in sentencing.
In assessing dangerousness, the probable actual duration of the
defendant's prison sentence is an important consideration.' 9 Holding
other factors constant, a defendant likely to be released after a shorter
time could be viewed as more dangerous than the same defendant
expected to serve a longer sentence. Several commentators claim that
juries sometimes return death verdicts out of fear that the defendant
will be eligible for parole after relatively few years in jail.2° Our data
confirm that jurors' deliberations emphasize dangerousness and that
misguided fears of early release generate death sentences.
Expectations about future dangerousness play a substantial role
in juror deliberations. Table 1 shows, on a 1-4 scale, the extent to
which juror discussions focused on several topics relevant to the sen-
tencing decision. The first numerical column shows the mean re-
sponse in cases where the defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment. The second numerical column shows the mean re-
'4 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (b) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
15 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
16 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (a) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
17 The Supreme Court held in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), that the consid-
eration of non-statutory aggravating factors did not violate the U.S. Constitution, provided
that the state establishes at least one statutory aggravating factor.
18 Question III.C.9. References to "Questions" throughout this article refer to the
Juror Interview Instrument, supra note 10. Referenced questions not reproduced in tables
in the text are included in the Appendix.
19 Cf. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1003 (1983) (approving a jury instruction
that the Court characterized as inviting the jury to assess whether the defendant was some-
one whose probable future behavior would make it undesirable that he be permitted to
return to society).
20 E.g., Lane, supra note 5, at 334.
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sponse in cases where the death penalty was imposed. In calculating
the means, an average score for each case is calculated using the inter-
views in that case. These average scores for each case are then aver-
aged across all cases. Unless otherwise indicated, the number of
respondents to the questions in Table 1 and to the questions reported
in all subsequent tables ranges from 104 to 114.
TABLE 1
Focus OF JUROR DIscussIoNs IN CAPITAL CASES
(QUESTION III.D.2)
QUFSION III.D.2. How much did the discussion among the jurors focus on the follow-
ing topics?
(1=great deal 2=fair amount 3=not much 4=not at all)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
Items Relting to Defendant's Dangerousness
Defendant's dangerousness if ever back in society 1.84 1.78
How likely s/he would be to get a parole or pardon 1.66 2.15
How long before s/he would get a parole or pardon 1.79 2.23
Need to prevent him/her from ever killing again 1.59 1.70
Other Items
Defendant's background or upbringing 2.25 2.22
Defendant's history of crime or violence 2.11 2.10
Defendant's IQ or intelligence 2.20 2.33
Defendant's sorrow, remorse, or lack of it 2.16 1.94
Defendant's appearance or manner in court 2.55 2.55
Defendant's dangerousness to others in prison 3.39 3.39
Death penalty as a deterrent to killings by others 2.45 2.81
Reputation or character of the victim(s) 2.48 2.49
Loss or grief of victim's(s') family(ies) 2.27 2.09
Punishment wanted by victim's(s') family(ies) 2.86 3.16
How well the attorneys presented their cases 1.98 1.96
Jurors' own attitudes about capital punishment 2.12 2.01
Jurors' feelings for the family of the victim 2.55 2.49
Jurors' feelings toward defendant 2.30 2.40
Jurors' feelings toward defendant's family 2.84 2.55
What religious beliefs require 2.93 2.85
What moral values require 2.49 2.34
What community feelings require 2.88 3.06
Similarity to other crimes and other murderers 3.35 3.39
Other (101 respondents) 3.56 3.75
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Items About the Cime and Applicable Law
Defendant's role or responsibility in the crime 1.25 1.23
Defendant's motive for the crime 1.50 1.67
Defendant's planning or premeditation 1.68 1.54
Alcohol as a factor in the crime 2.81 2.88
Drugs as a factor in the crime 2.98 2.98
Mental illness as a factor in the crime 2.55 2.99
Insanity as a factor in the crime 2.95 2.43
The victim(s)' role or responsibility in the crime 2.71 2.51
Innocence or helplessness of the victim(s) 1.70 1.78
Pain or suffering of the victim(s) before death 1.80 1.82
The way in which the victim(s) was/were killed 1.52 1.37
How weak or strong the evidence of guilt was 1.41 1.54
What the law requires 1.75 1.76
Death penalty as what defendant deserved 1.74 1.49
Other than facts about the crime, questions related to the defen-
dant's dangerousness if ever back in society are the issues jurors dis-
cuss most. Discussion of dangerousness exceeds discussion of the
defendant's criminal past, the defendant's background or upbringing,
the defendant's IQ or intelligence, and the defendant's remorse or
lack of it.
Jurors usually conclude that the defendant will be dangerous. Ta-
ble 2 presents juror responses to three principal interview questions
about their impressions of the role of dangerousness and the time
defendants might serve if a death sentence were not imposed.
TABLE 2
JUROR FINDINGS ABOUT DANGEROUSNESS & BELIEFS ABOUT
ACTuAL LENGTH OF LE SENTENCE
(QUESTIONS III.C.16, III.C.17, IV.7)
QUESTION III.C.16. After hearing all of the evidence, did you believe it proved that...
(0=no 1=yes (transformed from 1=yes, 2=no on the original Interview Instrument), un-
decideds omitted)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
Defendant's conduct was heinous, vile or depraved .73 .89
Defendant would be dangerous in the future .74 .95
QUESTION III.C.17. After hearing the judge's instructions, did you believe that the law
required you to impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that...
(0=no 1=yes (transformed from 1=yes, 2=no on the original Interview Instrument), un-
decideds omitted)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
Defendant's conduct was heinous, vile or depraved .36 .30
Defendant would be dangerous in the future .31 .28
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QU S ION 1V.7. How long did you think someone not given the death penalty for a
capital murder in this state usually spends in prison before returning to society? (86
respondents)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
23.8 years 16.8 years
Table 2 shows that, on average, over three-quarters of the jurors
believe that the evidence in their case established that the defendant
would be dangerous in the future. And the more the jurors agree on
this fact, the more likely they are to impose a death sentence. An
average of ninety-five percent of the jurors in death sentence cases
believe the evidence established future dangerousness compared with
an average of seventy-four percent of jurors in life sentence cases.
This difference is significant at the .006 level.21 Responses to question
III.C.17 show that about thirty percent ofjurors in both life and death
cases believe, incorrectly, that the law requires them to impose a death
sentence if the evidence proves that the defendant will be dangerous
in the future.
Not surprisingly, jurors assessing dangerousness attach great
weight to the defendant's expected sentence if a death sentence is not
imposed. Most importantly, jurors who believe the alternative to
death is a relatively short time in prison tend to sentence to death.
Jurors who believe the alternative treatment is longer tend to sentence
to life. Table 2, Question IV.7, shows that, for the twelve life cases, the
mean time the jurors expected the defendant to serve in prison was
23.8 years. For the nineteen death cases, the mean time was 16.8
years. This difference is significant at the .001 level. The sharp differ-
ence between the expected sentences in life and death cases is consis-
21 The p-values (sometimes called significance levels) reported in our text and foot-
notes represent the likelihood of observing by chance a difference between the life juries
and the death juries as large as the observed difference. The reported p-values were com-
puted using a t-test for continuous variables and a two-sample binomial test for dichoto-
mous variables. See STEvEN F. ARNOLD, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 366-78 (t-test), 385-89
(two-sample binomial) (1990). For ordinal data, p-values were computed using the Mann-
Whitney two-sample statistic. See H. B. Mann & D. R. Whitney, On A Test of Whether One of
Two Random Variables is Stochastically Larger than the Other, 18 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL
STAT. 50 (1947). For categorical questions with mutually exclusive responses (Questions
III.A.10(a), III.B.12, and V.3), p-values were computed using logistic regression coefficients
and standard errors. The regressions run used life or death as the dependent variable and
dummy variables for categorical responses as the independent variables. P-values for the
logistic regression results are reported using Huber standard errors. See Peter J. Huber,
The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates UnderNon-Standard Conditions, 1 Proceedings of
the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability 221 (1967). Ex-
cept for the p-values computed using the Mann-Whitney test and logistic regression, the
data were weighted to reflect the fact that different numbers ofjurors were interviewed for
different cases. Weighting does not materially affect the results.
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tent with other studies of jurors in capital cases22 and with surveys of
the population at large.
23
Since expected nondeath sentences play a major role in sentenc-
ing deliberations, jurors should be accurately informed about the
nondeath alternative. Under South Carolina law, a person who is con-
victed of (or pleads guilty to) murder but is not sentenced to death is
automatically sentenced to life without any possibility of parole for
twenty years.24 If an aggravating circumstance is found by the jury,
but no death sentence is imposed, the minimum period of incarcera-
tion before parole is thirty years.25 Eligibility for parole does not man-
date parole, so the murderer may well serve in excess of the twenty or
thirty year minimum before release. Moreover, if the defendant has a
prior violent felony conviction, there is no possibility of parole.2 6 Gu-
bernatorial commutation of a death sentence does not render the de-
fendant eligible for parole.27 And no person who pleads guilty to or is
convicted of murder is eligible for work-release credits, good-time
credits, or "any other credit that would reduce" the mandatory term
of imprisonment.2
8
Yet jurors in capital cases cannot be told of the mandated
nondeath sentences. In State v. Torrence,29 the South Carolina
Supreme Court prohibited the trial judge from instructing jurors
about the alternative to a death sentence. In particular, judges may
not inform jurors about the minimum term that must be served
before a defendant is eligible for parole. Judges may only instruct that
the terms "life imprisonment" and "death sentence" are to be under-
stood in their plain and ordinary meaning.30
Refusing to inform jurors about the statutorily mandated length
of nondeath sentences appears to lead jurors to sentence to death
when they would not do so if they were more fully informed of the
law. There is no justification for executing people because the state
22 William Bowers, Research Note: Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's
Misgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 LAw & Soc'v REv. 157, 170 (1993) (reporting
Capital Jury Project results for two other states as well as South Carolina).
23 E.g., Hughes, supra note 1, at 408-09.
24 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
25 Id.
26 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
27 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
28 Id.
29 406 S.E.2d 315, 321 (S.C. 1991) (ChandlerJ., concurring in which a majorityjoins)
(overruling State v. Atkins, 360 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1987)).
30 State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175 (S.C.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 57 (1993). Some of
the cases in our sample were decided when State v. Atkins, supra note 29, allowed jurors to
be told of the alternative to a death sentence. This may help explain the difference in
expected sentence between life case and death case jurors. Regardless of the source of
jurors' expectations about sentence length, the fact remains that those jurors who ex-
pected longer sentences tended to vote for life.
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has prevented jurors from learning the law governing a critical aspect
of the case.
One caveat is in order. As in many empirical studies of legal phe-
nomena, one must be concerned about questions of cause and effect
for the observed results.3 ' For example, death case jurors may, after
the fact, report shorter expected sentences because they know their
jury imposed the death sentence. Since their jury imposed the death
sentence, their ex post reasoning may go, they must have thought the
defendant would have a relatively short sentence if not executed.
Two factors mitigate this concern. First is a countervailing bias
not reflected in our data. If jurors' expectations about sentences
were, at the time of deliberation, influenced by the relative heinous-
ness of the crime, the expected sentence means should show a rela-
tionship opposite to that observed. That is, if death sentences are
imposed for the worst crimes, then those jurors who sentence to death
should report longer expected sentences, not shorter ones, than ju-
rors who do not sentence to death.
Second, what we know about juror behavior contemporaneous
with the capital sentencing decision suggests that expected time in jail
influences jurors in the direction we observe. When deliberating ju-
rors ask the trial judge questions about parole, they tend to be looking
for support for not imposing death.
3 2
On balance, the simplest explanation of our sentencing data is
the most plausible. Jurors who sentence to death believe the alterna-
tive actual time in jail will be shorter than jurors who sentence to life.
III. CONFUSION ABOUT BURDENS OF PROOF
In addition to jurors' imposed ignorance of the sentencing alter-
native, their lack of understanding of the standards of proof applica-
ble to mitigating circumstances and the required level of interjuror
agreement also hamper the decisionmaking process.
A. Applicable Law and Practice
South Carolina law requires that aggravating circumstances be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that a death recommendation
be unanimous.33 There is no requirement that the defendant demon-
strate the existence of a mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable
31 See Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value of Counsek 20 Years of Representation
Before A Public Housing Eviction Board, 26 LAw & Soc'y REv. 627, 629-31 (1992).
32 Lane, supra note 5, at 335-41.
33 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
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doubt.3 4 And the Supreme Court has held that agreement on mitigat-
ing circumstances need not be unanimous.35
South Carolina trial judges, of course, instruct jurors that the
prosecution must prove its guilt case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judges also inform juries of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt require-
ment for finding aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase.3 6
But the statute does not require judges to instruct juries that mitigat-
ing factors need be neither proved beyond a reasonable doubt nor
unanimously accepted. And the South Carolina Supreme Court has
rejected an attack on instructions that do not expressly distinguish be-
tween the differing burdens of proof applicable to aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.
37
This silence with respect to the burden of proving a mitigating
factor does not occur in a vacuum. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard is deeply ingrained in our criminal law. It is constitutionally
required 38 and likely to be the default standard applied even in the
absence of instruction. Given the express beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
instruction with respect to guilt and aggravating circumstances, and
the general prominence of the reasonable doubt standard, it may be
asking too much of jurors to expect them to infer some other stan-
dard for mitigating factors.
B. Juror Beliefs About Applicable Law
Our data suggest that jurors do not infer the correct legal stan-
dard. Neither the aggravating nor mitigating standards of proof are
well understood. Table 3 shows that jurors who believe, incorrectly,
that aggravating factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt are more likely to sentence to death than jurors who do not.
No jurors on life juries believe that an aggravating factor may be estab-
lished by either a preponderance of the evidence or only to a juror's
personal satisfaction. In contrast, about twenty percent of the jurors
on death juries believe that an aggravating factor can be established
by preponderance of the evidence or only to a juror's personal
satisfaction.3 9
34 State v. Patrick, 345 S.E.2d 481 (S.C. 1986).
35 McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988).
36 State v. Green, 392 S.E.2d 157, 163 (S.C.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990).
37 Id.
38 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
39 Compared to the three other possible responses to Question V.3, the response
"Proved beyond a reasonable doubt" points towards a life sentence (p=.208). Our findings
aboutjuror confusion are consistent with those reported by the Capital Jury Project's prin-




JUROR BELIEFS ABOUT BURDEN OF PROOF APPLICABLE TO
AGGRAVATING FACTORs
(QUESTION V.3)
QuESTION V.3. For a factor in favor of a death sentence to be considered, did it have
to be...
(0=no l=yes)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
Proved beyond a reasonable doubt .84 .74
Proved by a preponderance of the evidence .00 .09
Proved only to ajuror's personal satisfaction .00 .10
Don't know .16 .06
With respect to mitigating circumstances, Table 4 shows more
widespread confusion about the proper proof standard. About half
the jurors incorrectly believe that a mitigating factor must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Less than a third of jurors understand
that mitigating factors need only be proved to the juror's personal
satisfaction. The great majority ofjurors-in excess of sixty percent in
both life and death cases-erroneously believe that jurors must agree
unanimously for a mitigating circumstance to support a vote against
death.
TABLE 4
JUROR BELIEFS ABOUT BURDEN OF PROOF APPLICABLE TO
MITIGATING FAcTORS
(QUESTIONS V.7, V.8)
QUESTION V.7. For a factor in favor of a life or lesser sentence to be considered, did it
have to be...
49% Proved beyond a reasonable doubt
7% Proved by a preponderance of the evidence
27% Proved only to ajuror's personal satisfaction
17% (Don't know)
QUESTION V.8. For a factor in favor of a life or lesser sentence to be considered, did
66% All jurors have to agree on that factor
21% Jurors did not have to agree unanimously on that factor
12% (Don't know)
The data also show that jurors are not hopelessly confused about
all burdens of proof. Table 3 shows that the great majority of jurors
understand that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required to estab-
lish an aggravating circumstance. It is this solid grasp of the tradi-
tional criminal law standard of proof that may limit their mastery of
the different standard governing mitigating circumstances. Juror con-
fusion, particularly about the mitigating circumstance burden of
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
proof, cannot simply be attributed to inability to grasp legal terminol-
ogy and concepts.
IV. THE TENDENCY TO SENTENCE TO DEATH
The mitigating circumstance data in Table 4 do not directly sug-
gest that confusion about standards of proof generates death
sentences, but only that such confusion frequently exists. Indeed, we
do not report life case means and death case means separately in Ta-
ble 4 because they do not differ significantly. Fully assessing the im-
pact of juror confusion on sentencing requires exploring another
topic-the default sentence. The default sentence in a capital case is
death.
The data suggest that the sentencing phase of a capital trial com-
mences with a substantial bias in favor of death. This is not itself an
indictment of the death trial phase. But the tilt towards death sug-
gests that a defendant with a confused jury may receive a death sen-
tence by default, without having a chance to benefit from legal
standards designed to give him a chance for life.
Nor is it surprising that the sentencing phase begins with a bias
towards death. The prosecutor presumably has screened out cases in
which death would be a wholly inappropriate sentence. The sentenc-
ing phase jurors have just found the defendant guilty of capital mur-
der.40 Jurors indicate, in both life and death sentence cases, that the
killing was vicious, cold blooded, senseless, and repulsive. 41 They be-
lieve that the defendant's conduct was heinous and expect that the
defendant will be dangerous in the future.42 They have already disbe-
lieved any defense the defendant offered on the merits.
These factors support our conclusion that indecision tends to be
resolved in favor of death. When jurors report predeliberation indeci-
sion about either guilt or sentence, the undecided jurors tend to vote
for death.43 Juror holdouts tend to be those favoring death in life
40 If a defendant is found guilty of murder, the sentencing phase of the trial follows.
South Carolina law requires that the sentencing "proceeding shall be conducted by the
trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable after the lapse of twenty-four hours
unless waived by the defendant." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
41 Question II.A.2.
42 Question III.C.16. For additional evidence that death can be the default sentence,
see Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 41-47 (finding that a significant number of
jurors in death penalty cases believed the death penalty was mandatory or presumed for
first degree murder).
43 Compared to the other three possible responses to Question IILA.10(a) (asking
about jurors' initial feelings about guilt), the response "Undecided" points towards a death
sentence (p=.024). Compared to the responses "A death sentence" and "A life (OR THE
ALTERNATIVE) sentence" to Question III.B.12 (asking aboutjurors' initial feelings about




cases. An average of ninety-one percent of the life case jurors report
that some jurors were especially reluctant to go along with the major-
ity, while only an average of sixty-seven percent of the death case ju-
rors report such reluctance.44 Thus, there is less holdout activity by
those favoring life in death cases. These findings confirm that, in cap-
ital sentencing deliberations, death is the norm.
Juror voting patterns and reactions to their deliberations also
confirm this analysis. Table 5 presents several measures of juror vot-
ing patterns and reactions.
TABLE 5
JUROR VOTING PATRNs AND REACTIONS
(QUEsTIoNs 111.2, III.D.10, III.D.11, VII.15)
QU=STiON 111.2. Did any part of the trial seem too long to you or make you impatient?
(0=no 1=yes (transformed from 1=yes, 2-no on the original Interview Instrument))
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
The selection of the jury .32 .43
Hearing evidence about defendant's guilt .12 .12
Jury deliberations about defendant's guilt .21 .09
Hearing evidence about defendant's punishment .07 .06
Jury deliberations about defendant's punishment .30 .09
QUESTION III.D.10. When the firstjury vote was taken, roughly how many of the jurors
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
Voted for a death sentence 4.72 9.67
Voted for a life (OR ALTERNATIVE) sentence 6.78 2.68
Were undecided 2.33 2.29
QUESTION III.D.11. As best you can remember, how many votes did the jury take on
what sentence to impose?
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
Number of votes 3.44 2.66
44 Question III.D.8 (p=.01).
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QUESTION VII.15. In your mind, how well do the following words describe the jury?
(1--very well 2--fairly well 3=not so well 4=not at all)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
Likeminded, saw things the same way 2.26 1.96
Closedminded, intolerant of disagreement 3.40 3.56
Too quick to make a decision, in a hurry 3.50 3.57
Friendly and respectful to one another 1.23 1.31
Decided on guilt and punishment at the same time 3.11 3.04
Dominated by a few strong personalities 2.60 3.19
Got too emotionally involved in the case 2.91 3.04
Was confused by the judge's instructions 3.25 3.34
Did not follow the judge's instructions 3.52 3.84
Kept making mistakes 3.84 3.88
You felt like an outsider 3.84 3.82
Table 5, Question III.D.10, shows that when the first jury vote is
taken in life cases, the average initial vote is reported as seven to five
in favor of life. In death cases, the average initial vote is reported as
ten to three in favor of death.45 Those who receive life sentences have
an initial bare majority. Those who receive death sentences have an
initial substantial majority. Question III.D.11 shows that it takes more
ballots for ajury to reach a life sentence than it takes to reach a death
sentence verdict.46] Question 111.2 shows that life case juries, more
than death case juries, complain that punishment deliberations made
them impatient. 47
Jurors express more dissatisfaction with the process in life cases
than in death cases. Question VII.15 shows that jurors in life cases
more often indicate that their juries were dominated by "a few strong
personalities" than do jurors in death cases.48 Jurors in life cases tend
to believe, more than jurors in death cases, that the jury did not follow
the judge's instructions.49
These results suggest that a defendant on trial for his life at the
punishment stage has one foot in the grave. The defendant needs
affirmative action by jurors to pluck him from the crypt, action that is
likely to annoy other jurors, at least initially. The juror favoring life
faces a struggle against initial opposition that will last throughout the
deliberations and continue to annoy fellow jurors in post-trial inter-
views. Depriving jurors of full knowledge of life-favoring legal stan-
dards may not directly cause them to vote for death, but confusion
about such standards mutes the impact of burdens of proof designed
to favor life.
45 Question III.D.10 (p=.000).
46 Question III.D.11 (p=.07).
47 Question 111.2 (p=.027).
48 Question VII.15 (p=.057).




One unaccustomed to the world of legal doctrine may wonder
why the issue we address can even be seriously debated. How can a
state ask jurors to determine life or death in part on the basis of dan-
gerousness, but intentionally deprive jurors of what they view as the
most important datum influencing that determination? Traditionally,
jurors were not told of parole possibilities in order to protect defend-
ants from jurors' inflating sentences to yield net sentences satisfactory
to the jurors,50 and to avoid intruding on executive branch preroga-
tives with respect to administration of sentences.
5'
The empirical data remove any support for the view that, on bal-
ance, keeping juries ignorant about parole protects defendants in cap-
ital cases. Juries that might otherwise sentence to life do not do so
because of false impressions about parole eligibility. The separation
of powers argument is also questionable. Informing juries about
mandatory parole limitations does not interfere with executive discre-
tion in the administration of sentences. The executive branch retains
full power to grant or deny parole. Informing juries merely assures
that the decisionmaker primarily responsible for the life-or-death de-
termination decides on the basis of reliable information about the law
and not on the basis of avoidable and inaccurate speculation.
Since the 1976 capital punishment cases,52 state statutes requiring
guided discretion in sentencing have dominated death penalty adjudi-
cation. Given the presence of discretion, punishment determinations
cannot be expected to be perfect or perfectly consistent. Perhaps all
one can ask is that states make their best effort to guide the exercise of
discretion.53 At a minimum, the process of guiding juror discretion
ought to be logical. It is virtually certain that South Carolina's system
currently misleads jurors about fundamental aspects of the punish-
ment decision. It is likely that juror misimpressions about dangerous-
ness and standards of proof could be corrected or reduced. Failure to
rectify these problems raises the spectre of arbitrariness in sentencing
that two decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence have sought to
curtail.
50 Hood, supra note 1, at 1617-18 & nn. 71-72.
51 Id. at 1618 n.77.
52 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Profflitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976).
53 See Robert Weisberg, Capital Punishment, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA o THE AMERIcAN CON-
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QUESTION II.2. In your mind, how well do the following words describe the killing?
(1--very well 2=fairly well 3=not so well 4=not at all)
Mean in Mean in






Cold blooded 1.60 1.06
Senseless 1.32 1.09
Repulsive 1.58 1.26
The work of a "mad man" 2.56 2.33
It made you feel sick to think about it 1.79 1.66
The victim(s) was/were made to suffer before death 2.07 1.74
The body(ies) was/were maimed or mangled after
death 3.15 2.84
QUESTION III.A.10(a). After you heard the judge's instructions to the jury for deciding
about defendant's guilt, but before you began deliberating with the other jurors, did you
then think defendant was...
(0=no 1=yes)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
Guilty of capital murder, that is, murder for which the
death penalty could be imposed .80 .71
Guilty, but not of capital murder .09 .00
Not guilty .05 .00
Undecided .07 .24
QUESTION III.B.12. After the jury found defendant guilty of capital murder but before
you heard any evidence or testimony about what the punishment should be, did you then
think defendant should be given...
(0=no l=yes)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
A life sentence .30 .29
A life (OR THE ALTERNATIVE) sentence .23 .08
Undecided .43 .58
[Vol. 79:1
1993] JUROR INSTRUCTIONS 17
QUESrION III.C.9. How much did the prosecutor's evidence and arguments at the pun-
ishment stage of the trial emphasize...
(1=great deal 2=fair amount 3=not much 4=not at all)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
The death penalty is what defendant deserved 1.18 1.21
The death penalty will deter others from killing 2.46 2.93
The death penalty will keep defendant from killing
again 1.90 1.94
The character and motives of defendant 1.41 1.59
Past crime or violence of defendant 2.41 2.41
Drugs as a factor in this crime 3.24 3.07
The brutal or savage character of this crime 1.43 1.22
The reputation and character of the victim(s) 1.86 1.94
The pain and suffering of the victim(s) 1.43 1.58
The loss and grief of victim's(s') family(ies) 1.48 1.69
The punishment wanted by victim's(s') family(ies) 2.51 2.87
Defendant's dangerousness to others in prison 3.45 3.43
Danger to the public if defendant ever escaped or was
released from prison 2.24 2.49
How defendant or this crime compare to other
criminals or crimes 3.15 3.21
Other topics (101 respondents) 3.80 3.72
QUFSTON III.D.8. Were anyjurors especially reluctant to go along with the majority on
defendant's punishment?
(0=no 1=yes)
Mean in Mean in
Life Cases Death Cases
